This essay attempts to respond to what I see as a persistent misunderstanding of Cavellian conversation and its relation to politics as such. More specifically, I find that critics of Cavell and his acolytes, such as Davide Panagia, tend to read a Cavellian politics as dependent on a conventional sort of judgment, such that Cavell's idea of "conversation" is overly similar to Habermas's notion of exercising "public reason" or a more general social contractarianism. Panagia specifically contrasts a Cavellian politics with Rancière's more actively participatory variety. Without wanting to dwell overmuch on Rancière specifically, I wish to argue that this contrast is overblown to the extent that it underestimates the stakes and confrontational nature of Cavellian conversation, and that it ignores Cavell's own account of what happens when justifications come to an end and one's spade is turned: something must be shown. I wish to link the kind of showing that I think Cavell has in mind to the long tradition of African American activism in the United States, culminating, thus far, in the Movement for Black Lives.
Zerilli's picture of two people diverging on the nature of some particular is full of political significance that Panagia ought to appreciate. First of all, that a person so much as takes another to be an "interlocutor" is a political gesture-it provisionally asserts mutual belonging in a group that, by implication, ought to see this "particular" in the same certain way. And it further evinces an investment in this belongingtogether: one does not bother trying to bring another into agreement unless that agreement (a) is possible and (b) matters. The giving or requesting of criteria is tantamount to wagering a kind of belonging-together that politics, at bottom, is. Far from any possibility of criteria-less co-belonging, criteria are recounted as a means of testing the possibility of belonging together.
There is also something to say against Panagia's association of Zerilli (or Cavell) with social contractarianism. Zerilli's criteria are nothing like "already agreedupon conditions." Whether or not interlocutors can agree is the very issue. In Zeril-$ . Ibid., xi. 5 $ . I'm indebted to Ingeborg Löfgren for making the impossibility of a "criteria-less condition of co-ex 6 -istence" clear to me.
li's picture, the fact that the interlocutors do not see the "particular at hand" in the same way is confounding to them. Criteria are elicited as a response to this confounding state-that another, with whom one would expect to agree, subsumes it in a different way, takes it to be something else. In that respect, eliciting criteria rather aim at what Richard Eldridge describes in terms of achieving a "reorientation" toward 7 this "particular at hand." In thinking of the criterial conversation in terms of Eldridge's reorientation or Cavell's "showing that the world is otherwise than you see," it becomes clear that elicited criteria do not appeal to any "common set of conditions" to which the participants have previously agreed. Rather, agreement is being sought where it had been heretofore assumed; the criterial conversation itself is an act of using one's own stance on the world as the (groundless, aspirational) appeal to another.
Panagia affirms the link between Rancière's politico-aesthetic thought and Wittgenstein's discussions of aspect-dawning; (Panagia 2018, 15) ; I suggest that the 8 eliciting of criteria amounts to showing rather than saying, and that its political operation is the facilitation of aspect-dawning in another. Eliciting criteria, therefore, is the very making count that Panagia's Rancière seeks. 9
Cavell's Acknowledgment and Making Criteria Count As I said above, I think that Panagia misinterprets the relation of criteria and its eliciting to the activity of judgment as Zerilli and Cavell understand it. On Panagia's view, judgment necessarily presupposes the (Kantian) subject or (Aristotelian) hypokeimenon, which always stands before or beneath any given action, and over against the $ . Richard Eldridge, ed., Stanley Cavell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 6. 7 $ . Panagia, Rancière's Sentiments, x. 8 $ . If Panagia criticizes Cavell and Zerilli for their reliance on (a certain picture of) judgment in politics, 9 he also approvingly cites Aletta Norval, despite the fact that, so far as I can see, she accurately frames Cavell as helping to dissolve a dilemma that Panagia's Rancière seems to tackle head-on (Norvall 2012). Cavellian judgment occupies the space between those horns, rather than choosing sides, as I think Panagia reads Zerlilli and Cavell. Zerilli seems to see judgment exactly as Norval does, as occupying an "In-between space (neither objective nor subjective as philosophy has traditionally defined them)" (Linda Zerilli, Toward a Democratic Theory of Judgment [University of Chicago Press, 2016], xvii). In Panagia's reading, though, Rancière picks the right side (active intervention) of this dilemma and Cavell picks the wrong one (privileging inward judgment). I'm arguing, with Norval and Zerilli, that the opposition of Cavell to Rancière is based on missing the active and public nature of Cavellian judgment.
objective world. Judgment itself is therefore something like an internal or private operation, which uses criteria as a means of determining what kind of thing or situation anything is. This view depicts the subject as (1) fundamentally isolated from others in (2) attempting to make sense of the world prior to acting in it. Panagia's Rancière objects on precisely these grounds: that politics must be participatory, and also, and therefore, primarily active in the world. Panagia is arguing against an actually-existing view of judgment and politics, to be sure, but it is not Cavell's or Zerilli's. What is evident is that most Black Lives Matter adherents recognize the inherent shortcomings of appeals to politicians, the courts, and other "acceptable" channels of redress, and have wholeheartedly embraced the arena of the street. 25
The political methods described above comport with Panagia's distaste for exchangeof-reasons politics, and so the way in which these methods figure Cavell's notion of a conversation that shows will elucidate the continuity between Cavell and Panagia's Rancière that Panagia overlooks.
At explicit issue in the demands and practices of the Movement are the criteria for the mattering of a given life. The call for protest actions in defense of black life emerges from a view that, manifestly, black lives do not matter. The criteria elicited here, the criteria of injustice, often focus on the dual facts that in initial encounters, police err on the side of lethal violence in the face of perceived threats to their own lives, and that in the legal proceedings that follow, indictments and convictions for these officers have not much followed. Blackness is disposable. This is the picture of things that the Movement places before the public, the acceptance of which, in Wittgensteinian parlance, would consist in our now being inclined to regard such cases differently.
But large segments of the political right not only reject this picture of things, but also take these claims, and these criteria, as specific attacks on their own version of the world. The mantras "Blue Lives Matter," referring to police lives, and "All Lives
Matter" serve to typify these responses. The criteria for the notion that the Movement for Black Lives actively denigrates and endangers police officers comes not only from the high-profile revenge murder of two NYPD officers, but also the exonerations of officers involved in deadly encounters with African Americans. These legal results publicly support the notion that officers were justified in fearing for their lives and discharging their weapons in self-defense. The "All Lives Matter" motto, meanwhile, takes the Movement to be singling out Black Lives for "special rights" or special treatment, which would fly in the face of American equality-for-all ideals.
Both of these responses to the Movement amount to confronting activistsand the third-party public-with contrasting pictures of the situation, pictures that similarly lodge a demand for acceptance. Emphasizing officers' roles in black death encourages violence against officers, and to that extent endangers their lives; and demanding "special" care by officers is tantamount to asking for "free stuff" based on racial identity, and to that extent is racist itself. I wish to highlight the ways in which the Blue Lives and All Lives arguments engage in Cavellian avoidance or refusal in the face of the Movement's claims.
